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DEFINITION ATID DESCRIPTION.
A license is an authority to do a particular act
or series of acts upon another's lands,without possessing
any estate therein. This is the definition generally ad-
opted,and is framed from the point of vier of the person
granting the authority. A satisfactory description of the
effect of a license was given by ehief Justice Vaughan:
"A dispensation or license properly passeth no interest,
nor alters or transfers property in anything,but only makes
an action lawful which without it had been unlawful."
Thomas v. Sarrell,Vaughan,35I.
The term has not always conveyed the same meaning. It
was one of the old rules of law that a license could not be
pleaded unless it appeared to be by deed. There the
word must have been equivalent to -- easment. In some
of the old books, "license to alien" o- "license to give
livery of seizin" are not unconnon,whee the expression
is apparently synonymous with "power". In more recent
times there has been confusion,"for that is often called
a license which is more than a license."
The distinction between an easment and a license is,
A
according to Ken ,often exceedingly subtle. In Pierrepont
v. Barnard,6 N.Y.,279,it is said ihat an easment is'
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"A permanent, interest in the land for some specified period,
amounting to an estate in the land,which is assisnable,is
i~revocable and gives a right at all times to enter and
remain in possession during its c(ntinuance'"t  While a
license "Is a me-e authority to enter upon the land of
another for a temporary purpose and to do a particular act
or series of acts upon the land,and gives no estate o,
interest in the land upon which the act or acts are to be
-L
done." This is another way of saying that an easment is
A
an estate and a license is not an estate. The distinct-
ion is not feund in the character of the acts to oe done,
nor is it contained in the temporary or permanent character
of the right which is in question,as one mi,5ht be le# 1 to
suppose from the above quotation. But it lies in the
fact that the owner of an easxnent can maintain his rights,
while a licesensee,as a rulehas no ri4;hts to maintain.
The subteelty of the distinction,therefore,is that reqaired
to determine whethe- a ziven transaction ol- agreement shoald
be const-"ued in such a way as to create or c, nvey an estate in
lands,or simply as a personal authority to do certain acts.
A lease creates an estate in lands and entitles the
less ie to possession. Bit between the rights of a tenant
strictly at will or at sufferance and those of a 1icenseo
as against the lessor in the one case and the lic&ensor
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in the other,the-e is practically n- -1iiference. Neither
can claim any extension of his privile(e or estate aw-inst
him from whom he deriv= his right,and in either case- any
act denoting an intention to terminate existing relations
is sufficient +o accomplish that r'-sLiit.
Such being the c aracteristics of a license, t is
evident that it i3 not within the Statute of' ilrauds, The
first and fourth sections of that Statate deal with estates
and interests in lands; but L license passes neither an
estate nor an interest in land. It may the-efore be p)v'e'i
by parol at any time unless there appears to be better evi-
dence.
HOW CREATED.
According to the manner of their origin,licenses fall
naturally in-o th-feciasses. They may be created by ex-
press agreement of' the parties; they ma,. result from trans-
actions w,thout regard to the intention ( r' the parties,because
a want of l ,al formality prevents them from having any
other effect; and they maya be implied f-om the relation
of the parties,o - +he natture of circumstances without an
agreement of any kind. For conveniencethese classes
lay be called expreaW,constructive and implied license.
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EXPRESS LIC;:NSr.•
Express license results from agreement. In ef"fect it
is a pr'ivilege o- permi.ssion to go upon o- exercise some
right over the land of the -;rantor. It is sometitnes.
a close question as to the intention of the parties,whether
it was the purpose to grant such a privilege meely,or
an interest of a more permanent nature; but if the inten-
tion was to grant a license,it may be done by parol,by writin.;
or'by deed,and all of the methods are equally valid.
In Prle vs. Case,IO Conn.,37!,the owner in fee of a
tract of' land orally gave pe-'mission to the father of the
plaintiff to e-ect a house on his land,and it was claimed
that this permission passed an interest of a permanent
nature. But the C(urt replied:
tis license is given by parolit imports
just what -eyn unskilled wcld think it imported. A
good understanding existing between these two men,
and the oner of the land bei-ng willing, to h-ve the
other fcr- a nei,3hbor,instead of giving him a deed of
land,which wo.12d authorize him to introduce an- one
he might choose,says ou may build you a place to
live in' It is a personal privilege - - -n
we have no hesitation in saying that it exp ires
when he who is the bjcct of it d ies."
A written agreement between the parties by ,,which the
first agreed. that the seconJ, should have leave to cut timbfer
and wood on his land,and the latter agreed that tne i "'l r
h.uild have leave to flow his lands by a dam,was held to
confer licenseSupon the parties ,which though mutual to a
certain extent,in that cne ra have been given in consider-
Artsation for the otherl ,were yet independent ,so that onemiLght
revoke whet1nr the other revoked ur n,+. Dodge vs.
Mc Clintock,,17 3T.Hf3836
A case often cited as an example of a license created
by deed , is Jackson v. Babcock,4 Johns.,I8. Where a
privilege calied in the instrument itself a "lease" was
given to the 1rantor of the defendant to build a house near
a mineral spring,and cultivate certain contiouous lands,and
the Jrantor of the "Lease" ccvenanted that-he. should not
be distuvbed in his possession and enjoyment while it
was his pleasure to remain. The court said that the instru-
ment was a mere license ,-a personal privilege to inhabit,ter-
minating as soon as the liceseeO sold the premises. It
has been doubted whether such an instrument was technically
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a license ,fMxxitxa-ppe,xsfor it appears that the "Lesee"
or "licensee" had an interest or estate in the land
even as against the grantor,at least beine; a tenant at will.
The grantor therefore rny have named the instrument more
accurately that the court.
A better example is that of the ]ast Jersey iron Co.
v. Wright,32 N.J. Eq.,248,where the agreement was that a
person and his representatives sh(,uld have exclusive riht
and privilege of raising and removing ores from certain
lands,tcgether with the privilege of enterfing into and
upon said lands for the purpose cf raising and removing
ores,and of erecting such buildings and machinery as might
be necessary for carrying on the mining business,andl pro-
vidin. for a -oyalty per ton (,n the ores removed,and for
notice upon ceasing to exercise the privilege. Another
example is Shepherd v. McCalnont Oil Co.,3{ Hun.,37.
These cases make Aat once apparent why a license
granted with the greater solemnity of a sealed instrument
gives no greater -rights that one created by parol. It is
purely a question of interpretation. Whenever it is found
that the intention of the parties was that a personal
privilege should pass and not an interest in land,then the
instrument is called a license,and passes only such pri-
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vileges as are 6iven by any othe' license.
Being of equal validity,licenses granted by writing
or by deed may be varied by parol,at least where they would
be revocable. Colcord v. Cabr, S.E.,6I7 (ga.),thou.,h
rteagely reported,seems to be a case of a license granted
by writing subsequen 4 ly medified by parol. But there
can be n, doubt on this point ,for it would oc strange if
a person could rev(ke but could not modiify a permission. No
compulsion rests upon the other party to exercise chan-ed
privilege.
The intention of' the parties beinj found,the presence
or absence of consideration is inmaterial. Nothinl is
added to the efficacy of a permission,nor is its nature
altered by the fact that its is given for con'sideration.
Weisman v. Ducksinger,84 N.Y.,51.
A license may be Jra-ted on condition. Every such
condition is a condition precedent ,or rather the doctrine
of conditions precedent and conditions subsequent is not
applicable to such agreements. The agreement is that the
licensee may do certain acts without being regarded as
a XaKKX.&R trespasser,provided he fulfils a certain con-
dition; whether this condition is to be performed before
or after the acts for which he has a license is a matter of
_-)
no consequence ,for if' he fails -n either case ,the protection
is forfeited. Freeman v. Healey,33 N.J..523. Mumford
V,, "7hitney,15 Wend. ,80.
C.ONSTRUCTIVE LICENSE.
"That ne incorporeal inheritance effecting lands,"
Says Alderson34, in Wood v. LeadlittlrI3 I.. 9 W.,838, "can
either be created or transferred otherwise than by deed,
is a proposition so well established that it would be
mere pedantry to cite authorities in its support. All
such inheritances are said emphatically to lie in grant
and not in livery,and to pass by mere delivery of the
deed. In all authorities and text books on the subject,
a deed is always stated or assumed to be indespenskbly
requisite."
On the other hand the statute of frauds declares that
all leases,estates and interests,and all uncertain inter-
ests in lands,',ust be proved by writing. If,therefore,
through ignorance or mistake,an incorporeal hereditament
is undertaken to be created or conveyed withoutkdeed,or
any estate or interest in lands is attempted to be secured
by parol,it is eveident that in either case the transaction
fails to accomplish its object. It does not follow that
the agreement s of no avail. Any act ;cne under
and by virtue of it must be with the consent of the owner
of the land,and exempts the other person from an action
of trespass. An oral sale of anything that the Courts
construe as an interest in land is invalid. The most
comon example is the sale (f standing trees. Such a sale
does,however,give a license to go upon the land and sever
the trees from the land. In all cases where the interest
is not incorporeal such transaction come in conflict only
with the statute of frauds,and are construed as licenses by
virtue of its operation. But when an interest of an incor-
poreal nature is in question,the courts have not been uni-
form in the reasons they assign for failing to give effect
to the intention of the parties. Some basing their
decisions on the provisions of the statute of frauds,others
on the common law rule,that all incorporeal Ihriditaments
must be created by deed.
In Hewlins v. Shippam,5 B. & C.,22I,where a drain
constructed th-ough the lards of the defendant ,under an
oral permission given for a valuable consideration,was
obstructed by the defendants,it was arguedl for the defern
dants that the permission was void under the statute; i+
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the c( urt ,witho-t deal inj with tht e ns iderat ion, adjudged
it invalid by the cornuon law,as it was an incorporeal
heridatament and did not rest in deed. Cook v.
Stear-s,II Mlass , 533,on the other hand,where the right
claimed under the license was equally incorporeal,was based
wholly op the statute of frauds.
There is no conflict between the two classes of cases,
for courts must find that incorporeal heriditaments are
interests in land,in order to bring them within the statute.
The modern tendency is to holP! the statute in regard,but the
principles of the comion law are invoked if it is necessary-
In Wisconsin,there was ,;iven by parol a right of way for
drawing logs for a single season. The court held that ,if
the transaction had been a lease,it would have been valid
under their statute; but the ri-ht of way was not the
subject of a lease; and,being incorporeal,it could nc't
by the com-ein law be created for a single year by parol.
Dtkinneen v. Rich,22 Wis.,524.
The same result is brought about when there is an
attempted conveyance of real property,but where,through
some defect,no title passes. A vendee,in such a case,
who in ignorance of his lack of title,exercises autho-ity
over the land,cannot be regarded as a trespasser.
-ll-
In Little v. Willford,31 Minn., 173; 17 II. .,282, a
church had been erected on lanrJ supposed to have been con-
veyed y the plaintiff tO trusteesfor the congregation,
but Nhich,throujh a defect of parties to the deed under the
Minn. statute,was not conveyed to them. The court held
th at,while the deed did not run to or purport to convey
any right or interest to the parties by whom the buil:ding
was erected,it was doubtless understood by all the parties,
including" the plaintiff,to b. an act authorizine the erection
of the church upon the land as was done. The plaintiff
meanwhile acquiescing with knowle'ge of the facts. "That
an entry and imp-ovements made under such circumstances are
properly adjudged to be with the lic~bnse of the owner of the
land, is well settled." It was also pointed out .hat
the fact that the parties are igncrant of the effect of
the deed does not make the transaction any the less a
license. Walt ,r v. Post,4 Abb. Pr.,389.
IMPLIED LICENSE.
Numerous instances occur where a license is implied,
and thAS is a good defense to an action of trespass)ffrom
the relation o- conduct of the parties or fvorn circumstances
surrounding the case. Men could not be social beings,
- I.)
businels ceulP nrit 5. carried c no ,erfencie4 could r t be
rvit ,no,- coi!V the aui.,vo:ity ' the c;tate crn-' de ava il-
aL[,'i,.,' it 'PO nocessary t.o obtain pe)'! iFSicn i±r CvJ"i
a b- a'orc it 'Hold be laivW'Al ,c p o te land of
another. C1st cn n cossity vc Y'.oined to r'x.ie
r pes-,mptio'--, that -e-tain acts a-"e done with the land-
oqnrs ccnse n't
A classification has been made of th. ;s kin: of license
intc thcl-e irplied by the ownor anft those implied by the
law. Colcy on Trts,a2 RdW.,36. In ,rnc sense
all itiplie licenses may be said to -o implied by law. 'i]-e
dJstiLctic'n appea-os t x!: a valid. one :rhen e'n d''ed with
'elation t(, the quest on cf revocation. Those implied
by the ow.er couzld Ic revoked by the owner- Those iplied
iy the law are ,:-ocd with(ut regar,, to the ac .&OzItate of
mini of hri on rho3e land they a-'e to ko ex cL11ed.
Of those implica ,y lu' mnUy be ,crt(ned th.t of an
orf-ier of the >w to enter and serve (,,' ax-cute a valid
process; 1,.ta (f -h:, public autho-ties O private _ndi-
vic]uals to ente . and Uk :r .) use of adjcining" premi3es
lay 5e necessa_ ry or c(;-v":nieri- .ir case of a fi.c breaking
out in a city; to enter an,] .1-.ate a n,'i.ance (,on p,-oper
(.cca 3)i . i ., ('i t,-- . pc:-t office f(,- rrnuil at -'eason-
'-71 C1T"( 1-4 If the disttiati(n point.cd (ut i-3 thr.
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real one,the implied license to a proper perIon to enter
an inn or a coach (A' a comn carrier i inplid .)y Lai.
Those i f pLi- by ihe oWner ae o "- nr,3'-oas. 3jeoe lo.
on 'To 'tls , ITlass i'ios ;.eLc icen.ses %-to ten cl--330e, z
'Vlhicj are well defineJ. 0,,iti thi,;e aiP. a,' mentioned
,, iipli"' d JY -iand desi -a-tn-  Ini cach class oy iLts original
....L)Oh ;h_ , a.;s iz,when th, parts i- (,ssC30ion of
lan-, has bun., i,,-f "y debts to anothe- , -ithoat any sti-
P.,lAt±on as to plac of ..mFoue'i tLh, 'Vrhn a party
iyL possession u.±d s as tenant a piece of property of
an(.t 'r. In such a case the I'w all(,tJ -,. !1-,tter to
ai., an ontl% apon the land for thice pLL'pCse of ascertain in ;
i7tcth er hi3 into 'sts r'j, e'ared propcrly oy the possosso".
F_' '-I, 'rhere -oozs have been sod wl!icli lie Jon ,ht
p.'operty cf the ,',dor. Sixth, Wherr, LGe possessor
of lands has w "n,1tly burd&nrld another with t possession
cf hi: (,ic foryier's ) goods. In such a case,the eoo-s
a- ! taker v.nd put upon the owner'- r 1ses
Sevent). , "". a cdss ,oos,,vit7aj L  -s act hvave Lotten
upon thc .- , oL' anoth .r. In such a case,the oner of the
maooJs m..y enter and take them. T. : ,"'v .re a
3rsren ters t' premi;es of anoth.- tc succor is beast
which is 11- danr of poishin, a i J. .en, Where an
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entry hasbeen made upon the lands of another by reason of
necessity,to escape some personal injury without the fault
of the person entering.
In addition to those might be mentioned the merchant,
Who impliedly invites any one to come upon his premises
and examine or purchase his ar-s . Or the professional
r'lan,whose office the public may enter on business. G owen
I
v. Philadelphia Exchange Co.,5 Wo & S.,II. So persons
in the habit of visiting others may assume that they have
permission to go upon the premises for that purpose. A per
son coming to an unknown obstruction in a highway may go
upon the adjoining land to pass by the obstruction.
Campbell v. Race, 7 Cush.,408. Under this head should
come the case of Teig's Appeal,62 Pa. gt.,29,where it was
held that in time of war the government h.d an implied
license to build barracks and hospitals on the cormons of
a city when no objection is made by the city 3  And
Heaney v- Heaney,2 Denio,625,where it was said that persons
navijating public waters havean implied permission to
fasten boats to a dock such as the one in question.
Lakin v. Amos,IO Cush,at page 220,held thai the law will
imply a license from a mother to a son to open a vault and
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leave there the corpse of his brothor,from the nature anJQ
exigencies of the case,the relation of the parties,and
the well established usage of a civilized and Christian
community. Where persons are accustomed to walk- or to
Be for a long tirr ,thay are acting under the implied per-
mission of' the owner. Driscoll v. Neback ?r Rosendale
,c. Co.,37 N.Y..637. The presence of a person when another
is building a dam so that the water will encroach upon his
land is evidence from which the jurV may imply a license.
Johnson v. Lewis, 13 Conn.,303.
This enumeration of implied licenses is not exhaustive.
The occassions on which they arise are very frequent ,and
it would -ot be profitabld to attempt to point them all
out,if indeed it would be possible to do so,
EFFECT OF A LICENSE.
"By the common law,every man's house is his castle.
Why? Because it is surrounded by a moat o-. defended by
a wall? No! It may be a straw hut; the windi may Vqstle
throujh it,the v'AA, may entei- it,but the king can not."
This doctrine is one of the most firmly founded of the
English law,and by it any intrusion,however slight,oL the
dominion of a proprietor,iS a trespass. Yet men are con-
-16-
tinuallyoin j upon others' land. License is unceasingly
called upon"to make that lawful which without. it had bcen
unl awful" .
Whenever a license is g-Piven to do any particular
act,it is lawful to take the means necessary to perform
that act. It legalizes the entry of? a sufficient number
of servants and excuses any injury which is the natural
result of 4 he act. Sterling v. WNorden, 51 N.H.,217.
Selden v- Del & Hud. Canal Co.,29 N.Y.,634.
When a license is Jiven,the law imposes upon t-ie
licensor the duty of extra care in case of danger. A man
must not give permission to another to cross his premises
on which he knows that there are hidden pitfalls;, without
giving notice of their existence. If a licensor's business
is such a; to render it dangerous to those whom he permits
to use his land,he must use extra care and reasonable pre-
caution to prevent injury. It makes no difference whether
the license is express or by implication. "If the owner
of property has been accustomed to allow others a permissive
use of it,such as to produice a confident belief that the
use will not be objected to,and therefore to act on the
belief accordingly,he must be held to exercise his rijits
in view of the circumstancesso as not to mislead others
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to their injury without a proper warnin'g of his intenticn
to recall the permission." Kay v. Penn. R.R.Co..65 Pa.
St.,269. Driscoll v. Newark ' Rosendlale Co.,37 N.Y.,E%7.
Houston T.C.R.R.Co. v- Boozer,70 Tex. 5';0. S.C. C
S.W.,II9. This duty,howOver,is restricted to cases of
unusual danger,and when knoin to the licensor and not
known to the licensee. Where the source of the danger i7
not known to the licensor,or where it was not to be expected
from a prope- exercise of the license,no warning is required,
and no liability rests upon the licensoi',nor is he bound to
repair for the benefit of the licensee. Batchelor v.
Fortesque,L.R.,II QB.D.,474. Ivay v. Hedges, L.R.
£, Q.B.D.,80. And it is to be presumedthat greater
care is requisite in case of a direct invitation to come upon
lands,thah when such use is merely permissive. Wright
v. Bost(n c. R.R. Co., 142 Mass.,296.
The licensee assumes to act with due diligence,
and negli.jently3 to dto nothing which would result injuroius-
ly to the property- Eaton v. Winni ,20 I'iJch.,156.
Selden v. DO1. & Hudson Canal Co.,2, N.Y.,634.
No prescriptive n,, can be acqui-,e under a linense.
A man's use- may be open and notorious,but it cannot be
-18-
adverse wlen it is avowe, ly exercised by the permiss on of
another. Nor does the length of tima in which the use
has been enjoyed strengthen the claim.. Cox v. Levis-
ton,63 N.H.,283. But after the revecation of a license,
user may becore adverse. Vehter v- Raritan Water Co.,
I N.J. Eq.,I42. Eckerson v. Crippen,IIO N.Y.,585.
A licensee cannot deny his licensor's title. Glynn
v. George,20 N.H.,114..
Whe'e improvements are made (%n the strength of a
license,they do not beculne part of tiie re ,lty. It is
presumed that there is no ki~k~zJ kxJi intention to perma-
nently attach them to the realty,when the holding is so precai
rioug. Such buildings do not come under the same princi-
ple as thoe erected wrongfully on the land. They remain
personal property. Barnes v. parnes,6 Vt.,388. Ingals
v. St. Paul 1. & 1. R'y. Co.,40 N.W.,528. (Minn.. But
where there are circumstances to negative the intention of
the parties that buildi-his shall remain personality,then such
buildings beceme fixtures. Where a person had license
to build,with the undertsanding that the land should be
afterwrd conveyed to him,the structures were a part of the
real estate. Ieland v. Gosset,I7 Vt.,1o03.
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ABUSE OF LICENSE.
Permissionto do an act implies that it is to be law-
fully done. Such permission may be abused,and cannot
be extended to cover excesses of the privilege granted,
or misconduct in the exercise of the privilege. In consider
ing this question an important distinction is to be mde be-
tween licenses implied end imposed by law,and those expressly
granted by the parties. This distinction was well point-
ed out in the Six Carpenter' Case,and subsequent decisions
have not modified the Joct-ine,no -stated it more forcibly.
"And fii-st it was resolved when entry,authority or license is
given to any one by law and he doth abuse it ,he shall be
a trespasser ab initio; but where entry,authority or
license is given by the party and he abuses it,there he
must be punished fo-r his abuse,but must not be a trespasser
ab initio. And the reason for this difference is that
in the case of general authority or licc,,se of law,the law
adjudges by the subsequent act quo animoe-,or to what intent
he entered,for acta exteriora indicant ±iteriora secreta.
But when the pa;,ty gives an authority or license himself
to do anything,he cannot for any subsequent cause,punish that
which is done by his own authority or license." Six
-20-
Carpenters' Case,"' Co.,I46. The reasoning in the case
applies with equal force to all cases of implied license.
It is not probable that the court had in mind a distinction
between licenses implied by law,and implied by the parties,
but they intended -1o Include both in the expression"given
by law." Jewell v. "1-yhood,44 !\.H.,474. It is an abuse
of a license to do any other act besides that for which
permission was given,or to refuse to do a lawful duty
imposed upon oneor to do the act in a manner different frm
that imposed by law or by agreement of the parties. Attack
v. Bramwell,3 Best & S.,590.
REVOCATI ON.
It is a common remark that licenses are in their nature
revocable. If this truth had been constantly borne in
mind,a great deal of the conftmsion on this branch of the
subject would have been avoided. Cases of apparent hard-
ship frequently arising,and denial of relief seeming es-
pecially inequitable in many cases; and early decisions in
the English Courts,being either inaccurately or incomplete-
ly reported,or containing statements of eneral principles
of law broa).;, ° than the facts of the case would warrant;
and the desire of the courts to break awaY from useless
-21-
technicalities qand~incorporate the spirit of the 2quity
into the law in some instances; such c6ses have contributed
to make the question of -evocation of parol license,so
far as authority goes,one of great uncertainty. Aside
from the somewhat technical rule that an incorporeal hern-
ditament cannot be created except by deed,there are others
reasons why it is hiLhl,,, important that licenses be held
revocable. Parker C.J . ,in Cook v. Starnes said th
"If the defendant's plea (of license) were held to be a )ar,
all the mischiefs and uncertainties which the Legislature
intended to avoi. (By the Statute of Frauds) would be
renewed; and purchasers of estates would be without means
of knowing whether incumbrances exist or not on the land
which they purchase." And in Wilkins VA Irwin,33 Ohio
St.,138.,it is said to be "The policy of the law that all
titles to land when effected by written instruments shall
appear upon the app opriate recordso that all may be in-
foy med who hold incumbrances ,their character,and where the
title reposes or is vested. But is this secret license
mode of incumbrance to be maintained? If scincum-
brances mi,:ht frequently be found to exist ,against which no
dilience couild uard or vigilance protect. Our records
would cease to be -eliable guides. To avoid[ all uncertaintll
-22-
to notify all wishing information regarding land titles our
registry laws were created,and their purpose cannot be de-
foated by claims of the character we are considering."
Such considerations are a sufficient basis for the genera'l
proposition that licenses are revocable. In '.he applicatio-i
of this principle,however,other interests are k'fected and
other principles become involved, Modifications thus
brought about and those contended for by certain courts
will be considered c-s exceptirns to the general rule.
FIRST, When coupled with an interest. That a
license coupled with an interest is irrevocable is undis-
puted law. The interest must be a valid oie legaly ob-
tained and the license is regarded as incidental to the
interest. If the license in such a case is of a perma-
nent character,or is independent of the interest,it so far
ceases to be coupled with an interest and loses thus far
its exceptional character and may be revocked the same as
any other license,though not 3o as to prohibit the ovner
from removing his property. Cooley on Torts 21n9i. Ed.,
260. Hazleton v. Putnam,3 Wis. 307. In this class
of cases,it is not that the license is irrevocable, but
a person cannot in this way nullify a contract,ot' dispossess
a neighbor of his goods which are without falt of the owner
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upon such person's land. Most of the authorities are cases
of the removal of property from another's land.
This principle was referred to by one or the judges
in 77ebb v. Paternoster,Palmer 71. But the leading case
is Wood v. Manly,If A & !;.,35,where it was held that tres-
pass would not lie for breaking op-i a gate and removing
a stack of hay which the defendan, I had previously bcught,
a license aiid remove the hay havin_ been given at the time
of the purchase,and assentcd to by the tenant when he took
possession,it being held that the license was irrevocable.
This principle has been applied, in a variety of cir-
ctQstances. In this connection shoild be mentioned the
cases of the oral sale of standing timber. Such a sale,
though within the statute of Frauds by the wei~ait of author-
ityoperates as a license to sever the trees from the
realty, when they at bnce become personal property and pass
tp the vendee* He thereupon has a valid interest in the
trees,and cannot be prohibited from- going upon the land and
temoving them within a reasonable tim-. The cases
are too numerous to mention, Owen v. lewis 46 Ind,489,
Claflin v. Carpenter,4 Metc. 580,being good illustrative
cases. Houses erected under a license which are per-
sonal property or other property upon land Ldnder like cir-
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cumstances my be removeJ within a reasonable time after
revocation. Rogers v. Cox,96 Ind.,I57; DeHarro v.
U.S. 5 Wallace,5 9; Ingals v. St. Paul T'.& Me Ry. Co.,
40 N.W. 524; Cornish v. Stubbs,Tsaw Reports I C.P.334i
Mellor v. Watkins,I.R. 9 ¢6.B. 400. The sale of the
chattel on the land of the vendor with permission to enter
and remeve it makes such entry lawftu]. Long v- Buchannan,
3 Gill & Jo II8; Or a conlitional sale with leave to enter
and retake poss4asion on failure of condition • Heath
v. Randall,! Cush,I95.
Cases of this description are frequent, and are all
decided in accordance with the same principle.
SECVTD, When executed. It is often said in the course
of an opinion that a license executory is always revocable,
but when executed it becomes irrevocable. The truth in
the statement has been .repeatedly pointed out,that an ex-
ecuted license cannot be revoked so as to maketacts done under
it before revocation unlawful. This doctrine seems also
to have taken its rise in the case of Webb v- Paternoster,
Palmer 71. But the case on which the modern doctrine
rests is that of Winter v. Brockwell,8 East.,309. Here
Lord EllenborouLoh remarked that he tho :Jht it very unreas-
onable that after a party had been -bed to incur expense,
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inconsequence of ha-ring obtained a license from 4nother to
do an act,anO after the license had been acted upon,
that the other shoul-1 oe permitted to recall his license,
and treat the first as a trespasser for having ,one that
very act. That he hId afterward looked into the books
upon this point,and found himself justified by the case of
Webb v. Paternoster,where Hau~aton J. lays down the rule that
a license execut <I is not countermandable,but only when it
is executory. , , And I-re the license was executed. This
case was decided in 1807. In 1303 Lord Rllenborough
in Fentiman v- Smith 4 Fast.,II7,where the privilege
claimed was the right to maintain a tunnel across the land
of another as an appurtenance to a mill,had said that the
allegations of the pleadings could not be sustained
without showing that the appurtenances were legally such;
and that the title to have the water flowing in the tunnel
over the defendant's land could not pass .ithout a deed.
These opinions apparently zontradictoty,were enough to
cause the cases to be distinguished, and it was pointed out
in Helins v. Shippam,that in Winter v. Brockwell the sk:-
light which was the object of a license was erected wholly
on the land of the defendant, and was not a servitude on
the land of thc plaintiff; apparently counting as of little
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importance the fact that the framework of the sky-light was
nailed to the plaintiff's housb. Overlooking this in--
cident which did not fo-m a distinct question,the case is
the I adinj authority for an important principle that a
license to io someththg on one's own land which interferes
with an easment of the licensor on the lands of the licensee
when executed,cannot be revked. This doctrine was further
enforced and explained in the case Liggins v. Inge,7 Bing.,
682. Here there had been a licnse by the plaintiff's
father permitting the defendants to lower the banks of the
stream,anderect . weir,whereby less water flowed to the
plaintiff's mill. The Court pointed out that everything
had been done on defendant's own land and was lawful except
for the right of the plaintiff; and since the water of the
stream ms publici. urs, and belonged to him who first
appropriated it,there was no reason why one could not
relinquish the ri ;ht obtained by user,and thus enable any
other one to make such use of it as if hisprhor right
had never attached. 'Ihr true doctrine a-d its
limitations is well illustrated by the case of Icrse v-
Copeland,2 Grky 302. in this case th' owner of a
Jam licensed an adj(oinin. p-oprietor to build an embankment
to prevent the water from overflowing his landand also
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to dig a ditch to diain the su-face water throu i the land
of the owner of the dam. It was held in accordance
with the principle stated., that th( license to build an,!
maintain the embankiment could not be revcked,butthat in
regard to tlhe ditch was revocable/
Anala-,ous to these are cases under statutes for the
flowering of lands by mill-dams. There the right to flow is
derived from statute,and the only question as between the
parties is as to the damages caused by tlie flowing of the
lands. It is said in Clement v- Durgin,5 Greeni,9.,
that "These damages the parity may waive o-' relinquish by
parol. He thereby gives the other party no new interest,
or rib.t over his lands; but he foregoes the right to dam-
ages which he might have enforced by complaint in the nature
of a personal action. The license given might have been
countermanded before it was acted upon; as if a party promises
to give money no action lies upon it,but having given it,
he cannot recover it back. He cannot reclaim what
he has given away." Smith v. Goldinc,6 Cush.,I54,
adopts the same view as to the nature of the agreement,
and decides that no writing is necessary, )ut leaves unde-
cided the question of revocability in such a case. Though
Clement v. Durgir was soon limited to the facts there
appearing by Seidenpa-ger v- SpeA -,I7 Ma j13,I23,there
seems to be no objection to the h(lding in 'his viev of the
case .
A careful survey of the line of cases here referred
to sh ws that they do not sustain the doctrine contended
4
for. There are cases,however,which squarely assert the
broad proposition that a license executed is irrevocable.
Notable among these is Taylor v. Waters,7 Taunt,373,
where a Theatre ticket for twenty years given for a valua-
ble consideration and used for several yeard was held to
give an irrevocable license to enter the theatre for the
remainder of the time. This case was overruled by
Wood v. Leadbitter,13 1 e W.,838 on the ground that such
a right must be created by deed. The latter c ,se was
followed and enforced by 1icRea v. 11arsh,I2, Gr1y,2II,and
Burton v. Scherpf,I Allen,I33. An early American case
frequently 'cited in suppo-t of the irrevocability of an
executed lic nae is Ricker v. Kelley,I Greenl.,1I7.
The case came up on demurrer and it was held that an exe-
cuted license may be prov d by parol, a position never
disputed. It was also pointed out as a distinguishing
feature that property placed on the land of another
under a licrnse remains the property of him who places it
there ,and cannot be removed -n" appropriated b,, the owner
of the la.-! without notice of revocation and a reasonable
time for it to be removed by it3 owner. Few if any
American cases holJ d rectly the proposition that a license
executed is irrevocable; usually other facts exercise a
controlling influence. Th e broad proposition is
frequently met with in the course of opinions,as in the case
of Clement v. TDuroin aoove,even in such a state as Massa-
chusetts where the policy of the Court has always been stron.-
Iy against the principle. But probabIy n6 case has been
decided directly on this principle. In some states, 'he doe
trine after finding favor has been repudiated,as in New
Hampshire,in the case of Houston v- Laffee,46 N.IT.507,
and in Illinois in National Stcck Yards v- Wiggins Ferry
Co.,II2 Ill.,384; and in Maine as be fore mentioned. It
Lay be said of other cases Vhere the doctrine is maintained
that they are founded on preceIents that are no longcr
followed and are untenable on principle.
, THIRD, When 6,iven on consideration o- executed at
great expense. Then a parol license has been obtained
and acted on at considerable expense,it is the doctrine of
many cases that the license cannot be revoked at least
lithout paying all expenses that have been incurred-
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Suits in law have been brou.Jht and the courts have denied
relief,saying Vthat if the plai ntiff had any remeciy,it
.vas in qquity, Foster v. Brownirj , R.I. 4.7. The G-cund
on which it was supposed that equity would interfere is
virtual fraud,or estoppel,and the court would1 be asked to
Jecree an injunction or speci;'ic performance. It is said
that the licensors conduct is a 1irect encourajement to
spend money and his revocation, if permitted,would amount to
a fraud.
This particular -octrine has not received much sanc-
tion fram English C~urts. In the United States,it seems
that it was first accepted in the case of LeFevre v-
LeFevre,4 S.':.R.,20I. Rerick v- Kern,14,$.& R. 7
followed,and formulated the doctrine that "a ri-Jht
under a license,hen not special/y restricted, is comtmlen-
surate .,,ith the thing for which the license is ;ranted-"
This principle has ben adhered to in sLibsequent Pef.iisyl-
vania decisions,17cKellip v. McIlhenny,4 W'atts,6I7,logi-
cally holding" that a license bipeds a purchaser from a
licensor, and passes to an assi6-nee of the licensee;thoujh
in Huff v. TMcCauley ,53 Pa. Stale, ,306,thle Court said that the
Doctrine of Relick v. Kern is beyon4li. the cornen l w and
the equity, practice of other states,and limits its appli
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cability to cases where money hqgs been expended or where the
parties cannot be placed in statu auo. This is the law in
Indiana,Campbell v- I. : V.R.R.Co.,IIC Ind. A tO; In Iowa
Decorah &'c. Co. v. Greer,'., Iowa,4.90 and in Ohio Wilson
v. Chalfaut,I 0hi Rep.,2,1C:,unless the case of Wilkins v-
Irvin,33 Ohi(l St.,I38,throws doubt on the subject in that
state. INeb)-aska and Nevada are said to maintain the
same principle,and the recent case of' Clark v. Glidden,
15 Atlantic ,385,in Vermont must proceed on that ground.
Other stltes have Given more or less sanction to the
principle,but in Illinois,New Hampshire and Maine it has
been expressly repudiated after finding some recojniticn.
Withotit test in.j the question by taking up in detail
the elemnts of estoppel,the fact that there is no deception
seems to be decisive of the question. Both parties have
full knowledSe of all the facts-.e licensee knows that
title is in the one jo'antinj -the permission. The
silence of the licensor while the other party is making
expenses does not worl an estoppel,for if he shoald break
the silence.he could only remind the other that title is
in himself and that the lisense is subject to revocati(n
at his pieasure; and this the other is conclusively pre-
sLn-d to know. If it be urged that were estoppel
applied,the g-'antee mioat as well be presumed to knowr that
a 1 cense accompanied by expense on his part is irrevoca-
ble,it may be replied that all agree that a mere naked
license is always revocable; -,nd it would be a perversicen
of the principle of estoprel to hold that a person rnav
hasten to make expense in order to estop the revocation of
a license .
It is to be presumed,therefore5 that when a person goes
to expense on the strength of a license,he does so relying
on the good will of the licensor or on the mutual benefit
of its exercise to prevent a revocation. 1f his real intent
and expectation is otherwiseit is without foundation,for
he should have acquirel a legal riL-ht if he wishes to enjoy
one. Woodward v. Seeiy,II Ill.157;Hodgkins v- Farriggton,
22 N.E.,73 (Wass.); and National Stock v. Wiggins Ferry
Co. 112 Ill,384.
• The same consideration ang9tye the position often
taken that a person cannot revoke ,,iithout offering to
repay expenses wherever the ex enses are incurred in the
execution of the license. But where the license was ori-
ginally granted for consideration,other principles are
involved. Such agreements are n(t against the policy of
thelaw,Freemn v. Headly,33 N. J.Law,b23. If the license
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is rev(ked before its exercise is be6",an,there is no reason
why the consideration may nct be recovered. In any case
if it is possible to determine what part of the considera-
tion should be returned, there seems to be no reason why it
should not be recovered on the 6round of partial fail.U-e of
consideration. Smart v. Jones,I5 O.B. N.S.,717 is
refer-ed to as an example of a recovery allowed for a
breach of contract brought about by the revocation of a
license which had been 6-ranted for consideration. 2
Gray's Cases on Property,363 and Note. Damages were
allowed not only fo- the ccinsideration advanced but for
1-tospective profits on the transaction. It will be found
that the revocation of the license did not have any effect
upon this decision. It was a sale of an interest in land
within the fourth section of the statute of' F-auds,and
a written memorandum of the contract was made. There
was therefore a valid contract which could be proved,and
a breach of it gave a riffht of action for damages the same
as a breach of any other contract.
Cases of active frau-! may arise when equity should
interfere. And when the circutmstances are the samne as
those where specificm performance of a parol contract for
the sale of land is decreed,equity will decree specific
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performance of what in its inception was a license. All
of the requisite elements to take a parol sale out of the
statute must be present. There must be an intention on
the one side to crant and on the other to obtain a right,
anestate,and the t-ansaction must be followe, by acts
referable solely to the supposed contract. This prin-
ciple was recognized and wellillustratedin the cases of
Wolf v. Frost,4 Sand. Chanch.,72,Hazleton v. Putnam,3
Wis,117 and Johnson v. Skillman,29 Minn,27; in all of which
casesequity refsed to interfere,,in the first because the
action of the licensee was not referable solely to the
agroement,in the second because the agreement was too in-
definite,and in the last for both of those reasons and
also because there was an adequate remedy at law adnder
the Minn. statutes. In Cook v- Priden,40 Ga.,53I,the
court decreed specific performance on the -,round that the
conditions for specific performance were fulfilled.
The result of this study is that on principle and by
the weight of authority,licenses are revorableunless thev &r-
&ye
coupled with an interest )r ^in the nature of a relinquish-
ment of a negative easment or personal right,or the
circumstances are such as to justify a decree for specific
per folmance.
WHAT REVO1K S?
A license may of course be expressly revoked. An
act which renders any authority inoperative s sufl'icient
in the case of a license. A transfer of the property
over which it is to be exercised or the death of' either
party operates as a revocation. The same result occurs
when there is a subsequent Lrant of a privilege to another
person inconsistent with the exercise of a license formerly
given. Eckerson v. Crippen,IIO N.Y. 58. Being personall
in its natu 'e a license rzannot be assigned; but it is not
clear that an attemptei assignment would in all cases
operate as a revocation. An act indicating an intention
to revoee is sufficient. This was held to be the case in
Lockhart v. Gier,5A Wis.,133 on the commencement of a suit
for damages,and it was held that damages might be recovered
from the time of beginning thq action. aany of the cases
cited elsewhere are also authorities on the question of
%vhat amounts to a revocation.
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